This paper studies the classic information-sharing problem in a duopoly setting in which …rms learn information from a …nancial market. By disclosing information, a …rm incurs a proprietary cost of losing competitive advantage to its rival …rm but bene…ts from learning from a more informative asset market. Firms' disclosure decisions can exhibit strategic complementarity, which is strong enough to support both a disclosure equilibrium and a nondisclosure equilibrium. Allowing minimal learning from asset prices dramatically changes …rms'disclosure behaviors: without learning from prices, …rms do not disclose at all; but with minimal learning from prices, …rms can almost fully disclose their information. Learning from asset prices bene…ts …rms, consumers, and liquidity traders, but harms …nancial speculators.
Introduction
Information sharing among oligopoly …rms has been a contentious topic in the antitrust …eld and has received substantial attention from academics and regulations on trade associations. The literature shows whether …rms want to voluntarily disclose information depends upon the nature of competition (Cournot or Bertrand) and the nature of information (common value or private value). Firms compete in quantities in Cournot settings and they compete in prices in Bertrand settings. Common-value information represents shocks a¤ecting all …rms (e.g., a common demand shock), while private-value information represents shocks a¤ecting each …rm separately (e.g., idiosyncratic cost shocks). The literature …nds that …rms choose to withhold information in settings of Cournot/common-value and Bertrand/private-value, while they choose to share information completely in settings of Cournot/private-value and Bertrand/common-value. 1 However, there is an important feature of real-world economies that is missing in this line of research, namely that …rms often learn new information from …nancial markets and use this information to guide their production decisions. The archetypal examples of these …nancial markets include the stock market and the commodity futures market. 2 Going back at least to Hayek (1945) , researchers argue that asset prices are a useful source of information for real decisions. Asset prices aggregate di¤erent pieces of information from various traders who trade in …nancial markets for their own pro…t motives. The trading process and the information aggregation are 1 See, for example, Gal-Or (1986) , Darrough (1993) , Raith (1996) , Vives (1984 Vives ( , 2008 , and more recently, Bagnoli and Watts (2015) and Arya, Mittendorf, and Yoon (2016) . 2 For instance, Fama and Miller (1972, p. 335) note: "at any point in time market prices of securities provide accurate signals for resource allocation; that is, …rms can make production-investment decisions...." Black (1976, p. 174-176) wrote: "futures prices provide a wealth of valuable information for those who produce, store, and use commodities. Looking at futures prices for various transaction months, participants in this market can decide on the best times to plant, harvest, buy for storage, sell from storage, or process the commodity...The big bene…t from futures markets is the side e¤ect: the fact that participants in the futures markets can make production, storage, and processing decisions by looking at the pattern of futures prices, even if they don't take positions in that market." expected to be a¤ected by disclosure of …rms. The question is then whether and how incorporating this realistic feature of learning from asset prices a¤ects the informationsharing incentives of …rms and the equilibrium disclosure policies in oligopoly settings.
In this paper, I develop a model to study these questions. My model builds on the standard information-sharing duopoly setting with demand uncertainty and Cournot competition (e.g., Vives, 1984; Gal-Or, 1985; Darrough, 1993) , where two …rms …rst unilaterally decide whether to reveal their signals about product demand, and then, after receiving signals and possibly revealing them, compete in production quantities.
In the standard setting without learning from asset prices, no information sharing is the dominant strategy for …rms and forms the unique Nash equilibrium. This is because disclosure reveals strategic information to competitors and reduces the disclosing …rm's competitive advantage, which is referred to as the "proprietary cost" (Darrough, 1993) or "competitive disadvantage cost"/"loss of competitive advantage" (Bhattacharya and Ritter, 1983; Foster, 1986) . For instance, high demand of the disclosing …rm may be indicative of high demand for competitors (i.e., "a rising tide lifts all boats"), which encourages competitors to expand their production, eroding the disclosing …rm's pro…ts.
I extend the standard setting by introducing a …nancial market, or more speci…cally, a futures market. The futures contract is on the commodity produced by the two competing …rms. Financial speculators, such as hedge funds or commodity index traders, trade the futures contracts (against liquidity traders) based on their private information about the later product demand. This information is aggregated into the futures price. It is natural that the speculators' information and the …rms' information are not identical and thus, …rms look into the futures price to extract new information possessed by speculators to guide real production decisions; that is, …rms learn information from asset prices.
In this extended setting, …rms face the following trade-o¤ in deciding on their disclosure policies. The negative e¤ect of disclosure is still the proprietary cost iden-ti…ed in the previous literature (e.g., Vives, 1984; Gal-Or, 1985; Darrough, 1993) . The positive e¤ect of disclosure comes from a more informative asset price that improves …rms' learning quality. Speci…cally, the payo¤ on the futures contract is driven by three pieces of demand shocks, which are observed respectively by the two …rms and …nancial speculators. So, publicly releasing the private information of …rms reduces the uncertainty faced by …nancial speculators. This encourages risk-averse speculators to trade more aggressively on their private information. In consequence, the futures price will aggregate more of speculators'private information, bene…ting …rms' learning from the asset price. Each …rm weighs this bene…t of improved learning from the asset price against the proprietary cost to determine its optimal disclosure policy.
There are two types of equilibrium in my setting: a nondisclosure equilibrium, in which …rms do not disclose any information; and a partial disclosure equilibrium, in which …rms voluntarily disclose their private information with added noises. This result arises in sharp contrast to the literature on Cournot/common-value duopoly settings which shows that …rms never disclose their private information about market demand (e.g., Gal-Or, 1985; Darrough, 1993) . In my setting, the nondisclosure equilibrium is more likely to prevail only when …nancial speculators know less information and when the …nancial market features less noise trading. This is because under both conditions, …rms have a weaker incentive to learn from the …nancial market. When speculators know little information, …rms do not have much to learn from speculators via the asset price. When there is little noise trading in the …nancial market, the asset price has already aggregated speculators' information very well and thus, the scope to improve price informativeness via disclosure is small. I show that …rms' disclosure decisions can be a strategic complement. Complementarity arises when there is a lot noise trading in the …nancial market. If this complementarity is su¢ ciently strong, both a disclosure equilibrium and a nondisclosure equilibrium can be supported. This multiplicity result also runs in sharp contrast to the information-sharing literature which shows that there always exists a unique equilibrium. When multiplicity arises, both …rms are better o¤ on the disclosure equilibrium than on the nondisclosure equilibrium for two reasons. First, disclosure of each …rm directly bene…ts its rival by releasing new information about product demand. Second, disclosure of both …rms reduces the uncertainty faced by speculators who in turn trade more aggressively on their information. This makes the asset price more informative, thereby bene…ting both …rms. Taken together, it is in the …rms' interests to coordinate on the disclosure equilibrium.
The most striking result in my analysis is that allowing minimal learning of …rms from the asset price can dramatically change …rms'equilibrium disclosure behavior.
Speci…cally, as mentioned before, in a standard setting without learning from prices, …rms do not disclose at all. That is, the equilibrium disclosure precision is zero in a setting in which the size of noise trading is in…nity. Now consider a setting with learning from prices and suppose that there is a lot noise trading so that multiple equilibria arise. As argued above, …rms prefer to coordinate on the disclosure equilibrium. It can be shown that as the size of noise trading diverges to in…nity, …rms' disclosure precision also diverges to in…nity. Thus, there is a discontinuity of disclosure policy at in…nitely large noise trading. Intuitively, when the noise trading at the …nancial market is in…nity, …rms cannot at all learn from the asset price and so the bene…t of disclosure disappears, leading to the nondisclosure equilibrium. However, when the noise trading is …nite (although large) so that …rms can learn from the asset price, they coordinate on a very aggressive disclosure equilibrium to improve the informativeness of asset prices, which is bene…cial for both …rms.
Finally, I examine the welfare e¤ect of allowing …rms to learn from the asset price. Relative to a setting without learning from asset prices, in a setting with learning from prices, …rms, consumers, and liquidity traders are better o¤, and only …nancial traders are worse o¤. Allowing …rms to learn from asset prices bene…ts …rms and consumers both directly and indirectly. First, because …rms have an extra signal (which is the asset price), they make more informed decisions, bene…ting both …rms and consumers. Second, in a setting with learning from prices, …rms are more likely to disclose information, and the extra disclosed information also bene…ts …rms and consumers. Liquidity traders bene…t mainly from the extra disclosure, which improves market liquidity and therefore lowers liquidity traders' transaction costs.
Financial speculators lose also because of the extra disclosure that limits the bene…ts of speculators in trading the risky futures contracts.
Related Literature
This paper is broadly related to two strands of literature. First, it contributes to the classic literature on information sharing of …rms in oligopoly (e.g., Gal-Or, 1986; Darrough, 1993; Raith, 1996; Vives, 1984 Vives, , 2008 . As mentioned before, this literature shows that …rms choose not to disclose at all in settings of Cournot/common-value and Bertrand/private-value, while they choose to share information completely in settings of Cournot/private-value and Bertrand/common-value.
My paper builds on a Cournot/common-value setting which features the proprietary cost. My analysis extends the canon of existing studies to include the realistic feature that …rms learn information from asset prices. This extension generates two novel insights. First, …rms either choose not to disclose information at all, or to disclose information to the public, and if they disclose, they only disclose information partially. This di¤ers from the literature which …nds that …rms do not disclose in a Cournot/common-value setting. Second, in the presence of learning from asset prices, …rms'disclosure decisions can be a strategic complement, which gives rise to multiple equilibria. This also di¤ers from the unique nondisclosure equilibrium identi…ed in the standard setting. When multiplicity arises in my setting, it is more likely for …rms to coordinate on the disclosure equilibrium, and on this coordinated disclosure equilibrium, the disclosure precision goes to in…nity as the noise in the …nancial market becomes extremely volatile. This shows that adding minimal learning from prices can dramatically change the equilibrium disclosure behavior of …rms.
The second related strand of literature is the literature on the real e¤ect of a …nancial market, where trading and prices in a …nancial market a¤ects production decisions, which in turn a¤ect the traded asset's cash ‡ows. This e¤ect is known as the "feedback e¤ect,"which is reviewed by Bond, Edmans, and Goldstein (2012) .
Several papers provide supporting empirical evidence; see, e.g., Luo (2005) , Chen, Goldstein, and Jiang (2007) , Bakke and Whited (2010) , Foucault and Frésard (2014) .
A few recent papers study the e¤ect of disclosure in contexts that feature a feedback e¤ect and the like. Gao and Liang (2013) show that disclosure crowds out private-information production, which reduces price informativeness and harms managers' learning and investments. Banerjee, Davis, and Gondhi (2017) show that public information can lower price e¢ ciency by encouraging traders choose to acquire non-fundamental information exclusively. Han, Tang, and Yang (2016) show that disclosure attracts noise trading that reduces price informativeness and harms managers'learning quality. Amador and Weill (2010) show that releasing public information about monetary and/or productivity shocks can reduce welfare through reducing the informational e¢ ciency of the good price system. Goldstein and Yang (2018) show that disclosure can be either good or bad, depending on whether disclosure is about the dimension about which the …rm already knows. In contrast, in my paper, disclosure bene…ts rather than harms …rms via the feedback e¤ect, and the cost of disclosure is endogenously generated from losing a competitive advantage (the proprietary cost) that is unique to the oligopoly setting. In addition, almost all the existing studies are conducted in a one-…rm setting, while my analysis features multiple …rms, and this multi-…rm feature generates coordination disclosure motives among …rms, which leads to the possibility of multiple disclosure equilibria.
The positive e¤ect of disclosure in my paper is related to the "residual risk e¤ect" in Bond and Goldstein (2015) and the "uncertainty reduction e¤ect" in Goldstein and Yang (2015) . That is, releasing information about shocks that are unknown to traders reduces the uncertainty faced by traders. Since traders are risk averse, the re-duction in risk incentivizes them to trade more on their information. In consequence, the price will aggregate more of traders' private information, bene…ting the …rms' learning from the asset price. My analysis incorporates this uncertainty reduction e¤ect into a standard information-sharing duopoly setting that has so far ignored the realistic feature that …rms can extract information from …nancial markets to guide production decisions. This extension has yielded many novel insights. For instance, unlike in the standard information-sharing setting where …rms hide information, in my setting, …rms can disclose information, and in some cases, multiple equilibria can be supported. My analysis also shows that allowing minimal learning from asset prices can dramatically change …rms'disclosure behavior.
The Model
I consider a standard information-sharing duopoly setting (e.g., Vives, 1984; Gal-Or, 1985; Darrough, 1993) , which is extended with a …nancial market, or more speci…cally, with a futures market on the commodity produced by two competitive …rms.
There are three dates, t = 0; 1; and 2. On date 0, two competing …rms, …rm A and …rm B, simultaneously decide on their disclosure policies. On date 1, …nancial speculators and liquidity traders trade commodity futures. Financial speculators are endowed with private information about the later demand for the …rms' products, which is aggregated into the equilibrium futures price. Firms make inference on this information from the futures price to guide their production decisions. On date 2, the product market opens and the product price is determined.
Consumers: Demand for Products
The date-2 demand for …rms'products is generated by a representative consumer who maximizes consumer surplus,
where Q is the amount of good purchased from the …rms and p is the product price.
In (1), U (Q; A ; B ; ) captures the consumer's intrinsic utility from consuming the products, while the term pQ is the cost of purchasing the products. Following the literature (e.g., Singh and Vives, 1984) , I specify a quasi-linear intrinsic utility function as follows:
Parameter m is a positive constant, which captures the size of the product market.
Variables A ; B , and are three mutuality independent demand shocks that are normally distributed; that is, A N 0; 1 , B N 0; 1 , and N 0; 1 (with > 0 and > 0). These three demand shocks are observed by …rm A, …rm B, and …nancial speculators, respectively.
The representative consumer chooses product quantity Q to maximize her preference (1) taking the product price p as given. This maximization problem leads to the following standard linear inverse demand function for …rms'products:
For the sake of simplicity, I have assumed that both …rms produce identical products.
Alternatively, I can assume that …rms produce di¤erentiated products and the results do not change under this alternative assumption.
Firms: Information Disclosure and Goods Production
The two …rms make two decisions in the economy, a disclosure-policy decision on date 0 and a goods-production decision on date 1. Their production decisions determine the supply of products in the product market. Following Darrough (1993) , I assume that on date 0, …rms A and B respectively observe demand shocks A and B . 3 Firms precommit themselves in advance to a particular disclosure policy ex ante before they receive their private information. Such a commitment may be coordinated and enforced by trade associations or regulatory agencies such as the FASB or the SEC.
Firm A discloses a noisier version of A to the public in the form of
and is independent of all other shocks.
Similarly, …rm B discloses a nosier version of B in the form of
The random variables and are the noises added respectively by the two …rms in their disclosed signals. The precision levels and are chosen by the …rms at the beginning of date 0 to maximize their unconditional expected pro…ts. In particular, I allow and to take values of 0 and 1, which correspond respectively to the case in which the …rms do not disclose (i.e., disclose with in…nite noise) and to the case in which the …rms disclose their private information perfectly (i.e., disclose without noise). In the literature, these two values are the only possible equilibrium choices (see the survey by Vives (2008)). By contrast, I will show that in the presence of learning from asset prices, …rms can choose to disclose their information imperfectly (i.e., 2 (0; 1) and 2 (0; 1)).
On date 1, …rms make production decisions to maximize pro…ts based on private and public information. As mentioned above, …rm A's private information is A and …rm B's private information is B . There are three pieces of public information:
public disclosure x released by …rm A, public disclosure y released by …rm B, and the price f of a …nancial asset. The innovation of this paper is that …rms extract information from the asset price f to guide their production decisions. As discussed in the Introduction, the literature labels this feature as the "feedback e¤ect,"whereby trading and prices in …nancial markets a¤ect real investment decisions, which in turn a¤ect the …nancial asset's payo¤s (see the review article by Bond, Edmans, and
Goldstein (2012)). In my setup, I assume that the …nancial asset is a futures contract on the commodity produced by the two …rms, and I will discuss its price formation in the next subsection.
I normalize the marginal cost of production as 0. As known in the literature, this normalization does not a¤ect the results. Under this normalization, …rm i's pro…t is
for i; j 2 fA; Bg and i 6 = j. Variables q i and q j are respectively the amount of goods produced by the two …rms. The second equality in (4) follows from the inverse demand function (3) and Q = q A + q B . Thus, the optimal date-1 production q i of …rm i is determined by
where E [ j i ; x; y; f ] is the conditional expectation operator and q j refers to …rm j's optimal production, which is taken as given in …rm i's production decision problem.
The optimal date-0 disclosure decision of …rm A is determined by
Similarly, the optimal date-0 disclosure decision of …rm B is determined by
When making the disclosure policy choice, each …rm takes the other …rm's disclosure policy as given and also takes into account how its own disclosure a¤ects the optimal production decisions of both …rms in the product market.
Financial Market
On date 1, a …nancial market opens. There are two tradable assets: a futures contract and a risk-free asset. I normalize the net risk-free rate as 0. The payo¤ on the futures contract is the date-2 product spot price p. Each unit of futures contract is traded at an endogenous price f . The total supply of futures contracts is 0.
There are two groups of market participants: …nancial speculators and liquidity traders. Liquidity traders represent random transient demands in the futures market and they as a group demand u units of the commodity futures, where u N (0; 1 u ) with u 2 (0; 1). As usual, liquidity traders, also known as "noise traders,"provide the randomness (noise) necessary to make the rational expectations equilibrium partially revealing. I do not endogenize the behavior of liquidity traders; rather, I view them as individuals who are trading to invest new cash ‡ows or to liquidate assets to meet unexpected consumption needs.
There is a continuum [0; 1] of …nancial speculators who derive expected utility only from their date-2 wealth. They have constant absolute risk aversion (CARA) utility functions with a common coe¢ cient of risk aversion > 0. Speculators are endowed with cash only, and for simplicity I suppose that their endowment is 0. These traders can be interpreted as hedge funds or commodity index traders. 4 Financial speculators privately observe demand shock and thus their trading injects this information into the futures price f . Three remarks are in order. First, for simplicity, I have assumed that the private information of speculators is independent of the private information A and B of …rms. This assumption is not crucial for driving the result. What matters is that speculators as a group own some information which is new to …rms, so that …rms learn information from the asset price (which is the key feature in the literature on feedback e¤ects). Second, I have assumed that speculators observe identical information. A more realistic view is that they own disperse information (potentially very coarse) which is aggregated into the price, leading to a very valuable signal to …rms (e.g., Hayek (1945) ). I do not take this alternative view for the sake of analytical tractability, 5 and the current setup is su¢ cient for modeling the feature that …rms 
Timeline
The order of events is described in Figure 1 . On date 0, …rms simultaneously choose their disclosure policies, and . Firms then receive their private information ( A ; B ) and disclose public signals (x; y) according to their policies, respectively. On date 1, …nancial speculators observe private information and public information (x; y), and trade futures against liquidity traders, which determines the asset price f . Firms observe public information (x; y) and the asset price f , and simultaneously choose their production quantities. On date 2, the product market opens, consumers purchase from …rms, and product price p is formed. Finally, consumers consume, …rms realize pro…ts, and speculators and liquidity traders receive trading pro…ts.
The Equilibrium
Following the literature, I consider symmetric equilibrium in which both …rms choose the same disclosure policy (i.e., = ). As Gal-Or (1985, p. 330 Depending on whether …rms disclose information in equilibrium, there are two types of equilibrium as de…ned below.
De…nition 2. If = = 0, then the equilibrium is referred to as the "nondisclosure equilibrium." If = > 0, then the equilibrium is referred to as a "disclosure equilibrium."
Before formally characterizing the equilibrium, I …rst analyze a benchmark setting in which …rms do not learn from a …nancial market.
A Benchmark Setting without Feedback E¤ects
If I shut down the feature that …rms learn information from the asset price f , the model degenerates to a standard information-sharing setting with demand shocks and Cournot competition. As well-known in the literature (e.g., Gal-Or, 1985; Darrough, 1993) , concealing information is a dominant strategy, so that both …rms choose not to disclose information in equilibrium. This is because disclosure reveals strategic information to competitors, thereby reducing the disclosing …rm's competitive advantage.
I summarize the equilibrium of this benchmark setting in the following proposition,
where I label variables with superscript "?"to indicate that in this setting, …rms do not extract information from an asset price. The proof is standard and hence omitted.
Proposition 1. (No Learning from Asset Prices) In a setting where …rms do not learn information from a …nancial market, there exists a unique linear Bayesian-Nash equilibrium in the product market for given disclosure policies ( ; ), in which
and on date 0, no …rm chooses to disclose information, i.e., ? = ? = 0.
In the following two subsections, I will derive the equilibrium in a setting where …rms learn information from the …nancial market. There will be two main results that di¤er from Proposition 1. First, …rms may choose to disclose information on date 0, i.e., = > 0 for some parameters. Second, there may exist multiple equilibria due to the coordination motives across …rms, that is, it is possible that both = = 0 and = > 0 can be supported as an equilibrium.
Equilibria in Product Market and Financial Market
Following the literature (e.g., Gal-Or, 1985; Darrough, 1993) , I consider linear Bayesian-Nash equilibria in the product market. That is, the production policies of …rms A and B are linear in their information variables as follows:
where the a coe¢ cients and the b coe¢ cients are endogenous constants.
The optimal productions q A and q B are determined respectively by the …rst-order conditions (FOCs) of the pro…t-maximization problems in Part (c) of De…nition 1 (the second-order conditions (SOCs) are always satis…ed),
A Bayesian-Nash equilibrium requires that the above implied policy functions (7)- (8) agree with the conjectured policy functions (5)-(6). In doing so, one needs to express out the conditional moments in (7)- (8), namely to …gure out how each …rm uses both private and public information (in particular, the asset price f ) to forecast later demand shocks and its opponent's production.
Take …rm A as an example. Inserting the conjectured production policy (6) of …rm B into the FOC (7) of …rm A's pro…t-maximization problem yields
So, …rm A needs to forecast two variables, B and . The idea is that the public signal y disclosed by …rm B is useful for predicting B , while the asset price f , together with public disclosure x and y, is useful for predicting , because the trading of speculators 
Since speculators observe f ; x; y; f g, they only need to forecast (1 a ) A +(1 b ) B
in the above expression of p. In doing so, speculators use public information x to pre- 
Thus, to …rm A, the futures price f is equivalent to the following signal in predicting demand shock :
which has an endogenous precision level of
The signal s formalizes the fact that …rms learn information about from the asset The date-2 spot price function is
The date-1 futures price function is
By the expression of s in Proposition 2, disclosing information improves …rms' learning quality from the asset price. Intuitively, demand shocks A and B in the spot price p in (11) are the uncertainty exposed to speculators when they trade futures contracts. Releasing information about these two shocks reduces the uncertainty faced by speculators. Being risk averse, speculators then trade more aggressively on their own private information , thereby injecting more information on into the futures price f . This e¤ect shares a similar ‡avor as the "residual risk e¤ect"in Bond and and the "uncertainty reduction e¤ect" in Goldstein and Yang (2015) . 
Here, I explicitly express E A as functions of disclosure precision ( ; ) to emphasize the dependence of expected pro…t on disclosure policies. Firm A chooses its optimal disclosure policy to maximize E A ; , taking as given the optimal disclosure of …rm B.
There are four terms that go into …rm A's expected pro…t in (15). The …rst term m 2 9 is simply the size of the product market. Disclosure has no e¤ect on this term. The second term 9 +4 36 ( + ) captures the "proprietary cost" (Darrough, 1993) or "competitive disadvantage cost" (Foster, 1986) , whereby disclosing private information reduces the disclosing …rm's competitive advantage. Disclosure harms …rm A's pro…ts via this second term; that is, @ 
That is, disclosing private information harms …rm A via the proprietary cost but bene…ts …rm A via improving price informativeness.
Disclosure Policy Characterization
The equilibrium disclosure policies ; form a Nash equilibrium. That is,
where …rm A's pro…t function E A ( ; ) is given by equation (15) and …rm B's pro…t function E B ( ; ) is de…ned similarly. There are two types of disclosure policies in a symmetric equilibrium: (1) a "nondisclosure equilibrium," where both …rms do not disclose information (i.e., = = 0); and (2) a "disclosure equilibrium," where both …rms disclose information (i.e., = > 0). The following two theorems respectively characterize these two types of equilibrium. Theorem 2. (Disclosure Equilibrium) A disclosure equilibrium ; 2 R 2 ++ (with = ) is characterized by the following three conditions:
(a) (FOC)
> 0 is a solution to the fourth order polynomial,
(b) (SOC) satis…es the second-order condition, S S 6 6 + S 5 5 + S 4 4 + S 3 3 + S 2 2 + S 1 + S 0 0;
(c) (Global maximum) is a global maximum of E A ; , that is,
where^ is the positive roots of the fourth order polynomial:
The F -coe¢ cients, S-coe¢ cients, and G-coe¢ cients are given in the appendix.
Theorem 1 characterizes the conditions that support the nondisclosure equilibrium. Theorem 2 characterizes a disclosure equilibrium in three conditions in the form of polynomials of the disclosure policy . The …rst two conditions respectively correspond to the …rst and second order conditions, while the last condition ensures that the optimal disclosure maximizes ex ante expected pro…ts globally, rather than only locally. Theorems 1 and 2 suggest the following four-step algorithm to compute all the linear symmetric equilibria:
Step 1: Employ Theorem 1 to check whether the nondisclosure equilibrium is supported.
Step 2: Compute all the positive roots of the fourth order polynomial in Part (a) of Theorem 2 to serve as candidates of disclosure equilibria.
Step 3: For each root computed in Step 2, check whether the SOC in Part (b) of Theorem 2 is satis…ed. Retain those roots that satisfy the SOC.
Step 4: For each value retained in Step 3, check whether the condition in Part (c) of Theorem 2 is satis…ed. If yes, then it is a disclosure equilibrium; otherwise, it is not. First, unlike a standard setting with demand uncertainty and Cournot competition in which no disclosure forms a dominant strategy for …rms (e.g., Gal-Or, 1985 Darrough, 1993; Vives, 1984 Vives, , 2008 , introducing learning from asset prices causes …rms to disclose information in some cases and not to disclose in other cases. Firms are more likely to withhold information only when or u are su¢ ciently high.
When is high (i.e., V ar ( ) is low), speculators know little new information so that the value of learning from asset prices is low and hence …rms choose not to disclose because of the proprietary-cost concern as in the standard setting. When u is high (i.e., V ar (u) is low), there is little noise trading in the …nancial market and thus, the market is already very e¢ cient in communicating speculators'information to …rms.
Figure 2: Disclosure and Nondisclosure Equilibria
This …gure plots the regions of disclosure and nondisclosure equilibria in the parameter space of ( u ; ). Parameter u denotes the precision of noise trading in the …nancial market, and parameter is the precision of …ancial speculators'private information. I have set = 1 and = 5. I use "x" to indicate the nondisclosure equilibrium (i.e., = = 0) and "+" to indicate a disclosure equilibrium (i.e., = > 0).
Again, in this case, the value of learning from prices is low and the only equilibrium is the nondisclosure equilibrium.
Proposition 3. (Nondisclosure) When u or is su¢ ciently high, the nondisclosure equilibrium prevails as the unique linear symmetric equilibrium.
The second observation emerging from Figure 2 is that multiple equilibria can be supported. That is, when u and are relatively small, both the nondisclosure equilibrium and a disclosure equilibrium can be supported. This is also di¤erent from the standard setting where the nondisclosure equilibrium prevails as the unique equilibrium. The multiplicity of equilibrium is generated by the coordination motivates among …rms, which are explored in detail in the next subsection.
3.4. Disclosure in a Very Noisy Financial Market
Complementarity and Multiplicity
Now suppose that there is a lot of noise trading in the …nancial market (i.e., u is low and so V ar (u) is high). The following theorem characterizes the equilibrium for these economies with a noisy …nancial market. where o (1) is a term that converges to zero as u ! 0. That is, multiple equilibria are supported if and only if the …nancial market knows more than 38:46% of the total demand shock. This condition sounds likely to hold in reality, given that the market aggregates information from a large number of market participants (although many of them are noise traders).
On the qualitative side, Theorem 3 says that multiplicity is more likely to arise when speculators know more information that is useful to …rms (i.e., V ar ( ) is relatively large). This multiplicity is driven by a strategic complementarity in the disclosure decisions of …rms. Speci…cally, recall that in the pro…t expression (15), the bene…t of disclosing information comes from the fact that …rms learn from the asset price. When there is a lot noise trading in the market, the scope to improve price informativeness via disclosure is large; it is particularly helpful for both …rms to disclose information to reduce the uncertainty faced by speculators, which in turn encourages speculators to trade more aggressively on their private information . When this complementarity is su¢ ciently strong, both disclosure and nondisclosure equilibria are supported.
Proposition 4. (Complementarity) When there is a lot noise trading in the …nancial market, there is strategic complementarity in disclosure decisions. That is, @ 2 E A @ @ > 0 and @ 2 E B @ @ > 0 for su¢ ciently low values of u .
Shaping Price Informativeness by Coordinated Disclosure
When the size of noise trading is in…nitely large, both …rms choose not to disclose in equilibrium. That is, = = 0 when u = 0. This is because …rms do not learn from asset prices when the …nancial market is populated with in…nitely many liquidity traders (and thus the economy degenerates to the standard setting without learning from asset prices).
Now suppose that u is small but positive, so that there is very minimal learning of …rms from the …nancial market. As Part (a) of Theorem 3 shows, when u is small but positive, a disclosure equilibrium is supported provided 4 5 . In addition, as u ! 0, the optimal disclosure policy diverges to in…nity on the disclosure equilibrium (i.e., = = 2 5 u + o (1) ! 1 as u ! 0). In addition, this disclosure equilibrium is a preferred equilibrium from the perspective of …rms: both …rms are better o¤ on the disclosure equilibrium than on the nondisclosure equilibrium. This is because on the disclosure equilibrium …rms make more informed decisions after equipped with more public information (the additional public information disclosed by both …rms and the more informative asset price). In this sense, the disclosure equilibrium is more likely to be selected by …rms. Thus, adding minimal learning from prices dramatically changes the …rms' disclosure behavior: without learning from prices, …rms do not disclose information at all; in contrast, with minimal learning from prices, …rms may coordinate to disclose their information almost perfectly.
On the disclosure equilibrium, …rms choose to disclose more information when there is more noise trading (i.e., increases as u decreases). So, …rms e¤ectively coordinate to disclose information to o¤set the negative e¤ect of added noise trading on price informativeness. In addition, the increased noise trading helps …rms to coordinate since when the size of noise trading is large, the marginal e¤ect of coordinated disclosure on price informativeness is large. As a result, as u decreases, price informativeness s increases, and …rms'production policies rely more on asset prices, i.e., both a f and b f increase. Firms are better o¤ on the disclosure equilibrium than on the nondisclosure equilibrium. On the disclosure equilibrium, as u gradually decreases to 0, both disclosure policies and and price informativeness s diverge to 1, and investment-price sensitivities a f and b f increase to 1.
Proposition 5 relates to but di¤ers from Goldstein and Huang (2017) . Goldstein and Huang (2017) also highlight the possibility of a discontinuity of the real e¤ect of asset prices in parameters a¤ecting price informativeness. Speci…cally, they show that the asset price becomes almost uninformative when either the noise trading is extremely volatile or the speculators have very imprecise information. However, the real e¤ects, measured by the sensitivity of investments to asset prices (i.e., a f and b f in the notation of this paper), are trivial in the former case but are signi…cant in the latter case. In contrast, in my setting, as the noise trading becomes extremely volatile, …rms optimally respond by disclosing extremely precise information, which thereby causes the asset price to become extremely informative, leading to a signi…cant real e¤ect (investment-price sensitivity), as opposed to the trivial e¤ect in Goldstein and Huang (2017) .
Welfare E¤ects of Financial Market Feedback
In this section, I examine the normative implications of allowing …rms to learn from asset prices. Again, I use the setting described in Section 3.1. as a benchmark, in which …rms make production decisions without observing the futures price f . Specifically, I modify the order of date-1 events in the benchmark setting as follows: …rms observe public signals (x; y) and simultaneously choose their production quantities;
then speculators receive private information , observe public signals (x; y), and trade futures against liquidity traders, which determines the asset price f . I still use "?"and "*"to respectively label the equilibrium variables in the benchmark setting without learning from asset prices and in the main setting with learning from prices. The welfare variables of interest are: the expected pro…ts of …rms, E A and E B ; the expected consumer surplus, CS; the certainty equivalent of …nancial speculator, CE S ; and the expected trading revenue of liquidity traders, ER L .
Allowing …rms to learn from asset prices bene…ts all agents except for …nancial speculators. That is,
It is intuitive that both …rms and consumers bene…t from the …nancial feedback e¤ect, since in the setting with learning from prices, …rms make more informed decisions by accessing to more information (the public information (x; y) disclosed by both …rms and the futures price f ).
Following Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) , I compute the ex-ante certainty equivalent of …nancial traders as follows:
So, public disclosure of …rms harms speculators (i.e., @CE S @ < 0). This is because releasing public information about later commodity demand shocks brings the asset price closer to its fundamental, which therefore limits the bene…t of speculators in trading a risky asset. This idea shares a similar spirit as the well-known "Hirshleifer e¤ect" (Hirshleifer, 1971 ; see also Kurlat and Veldkamp (2015) and Goldstein and Yang (2017) for related discussions). Given that …rms sometimes choose to disclose information in a setting with learning from prices and that they always choose to withhold information in the benchmark setting without learning from prices, speculators are weakly worse o¤ in the former than in the latter settings; that is, CE S CE ?
S because ? = 0.
I have not formally modeled the behavior of liquidity traders and thus it is impossible to conduct a complete welfare analysis on this type of traders. Instead, I follow the microstructure literature and compute their expected trading revenue to proxy for the welfare of liquidity traders. This captures the idea that liquidity traders are better o¤ if they can realize their hedging or liquidity needs at a lower expected opportunity cost (see Easley, O'Hara, and Yang (2016) for more discussions). Intuitively, the revenue that liquidity traders receive from buying u shares is
Therefore, ER L is the negative of the expected opportunity cost associated with a trade of u shares and thus, it is positively related to liquidity traders'welfare to the extent that their exogenous hedging or liquidity needs are largely exogenous.
Disclosure improves the welfare of liquidity traders (i.e., @ER L @ > 0 in equation (18)). This is because disclosing public information improves market liquidity. Intu-
itively, more precise public information implies that there is less uncertainty about the asset value and so speculators trade more aggressively against liquidity traders.
As a result, changes in liquidity trading are absorbed with a smaller price change, which bene…ts liquidity traders. Given that there is weakly more public disclosure in a setting with learning from prices than in a setting without, liquidity traders are The top two panels plot the equilibrium disclosure policies ( = ) and price informativeness ( s ) against the precision u of noise trading in the …nancial market. The other panels respectively plot …rms'expected pro…ts E A and E B , expected consumer surplus CS, certainty equivalent CE S of speculators, and expected trading revenue ER L of liquidity traders. The solid curves correspond to the setting in which …rms learn information from asset prices, while the dashed curves correspond to the benchmark setting in which …rms do not learn information from asset prices. The other parameters are: m = 1, = 1, = 0:15, and = 5.
weakly better o¤ in the former than in the latter settings. That is, ER L ER ? L by ? = 0. 
Conclusion
I study the classic information-sharing problem in a duopoly setting with demand uncertainty and Cournot competition. My setup is a hybrid of Gal-Or (1985) and Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) and incorporates the realistic feature that …rms learn information from a …nancial market, as highlighted by Hayek (1945) . Disclosure improves price informativeness via reducing the uncertainty faced by …nancial speculators and thus, disclosure causes …rms to face a trade-o¤ between incurring the proprietary cost and improving learning quality from asset prices. As a result, …rms may optimally choose to disclose information in a setting with learning from asset prices, which di¤ers from the standard setting where …rms always withhold information. In addition, …rms'disclosure decisions can be a strategic complement. When this complementarity is su¢ ciently strong, both a disclosure equilibrium and a nondisclosure equilibrium are supported, and the nondisclosure equilibrium are more preferred by …rms. My analysis shows that adding minimal learning from asset prices dramatically changes the …rms'disclosure behavior: without learning from prices, …rms do not disclose information at all; in contrast, with minimal learning from prices, …rms may coordinate to disclose their information almost perfectly. Finally, I show that relative to a setting in which …rms do not learn from prices, in a setting in which …rms do learn from prices, …rms, consumers, and liquidity traders are better o¤, while …nancial speculators are weakly worse o¤. Overall, my analysis highlights the importance of incorporating the feature of learning from asset prices in understanding …rms'disclosure behavior.
Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Proposition 2
After expressing q A in (9) as functions of ( A ; x; y; f ) and comparing with the conjectured policy in (5), I obtain the following …ve conditions in terms of the unknown a coe¢ cients and b coe¢ cients:
Conducting a similar analysis for …rm B leads to the following additional …ve equations: 
Clearly, a necessary condition for (A1) to hold is H 0 0. Now suppose H 0 0 and discuss the possible values of H 2 and H 1 to check when condition (A1) holds.
If H 2 > 0, then H ( ) > 0 for su¢ ciently large , so that condition (A1) is violated.
If H 2 = 0, then H ( ) becomes linear, and condition (A1) holds if and only if 4H 2 H 0 0).
To summarize, (A1) holds if and only if one of the following two sets of conditions holds:
which are respectively the two sets of conditions in Theorem 1.
Proof of Theorem 2
A symmetric disclosure equilibrium requires that > 0 is the best response to Hence, any candidate disclosure policy > 0 must satisfy S 0.
Finally, …xing = , I can …nd the interior extreme values of E A ( ; ) by setting its FOC at zero, that is,
where G 4 = 5 4 2 + 1280 2 The extreme values of E A ( ; ) include (1) the positive roots of G ( ) = 0;
and (2) the two boundaries = 0 and = 1.
Proof of Proposition 3
When u is large
Fix the other parameters and let u ! 1. Condition (a) in Theorem 1 is satis…ed and thus nondisclosure is an equilibrium.
Condition (a) in Theorem 2 is violated, because all the F coe¢ cients are negative for su¢ ciently large values of u , which implies F ( ) < 0 for all > 0. So, there are no disclosure equilibria.
When is large
Fix the other parameters and let ! 1. 
where / means that the LHS has the same order as the right-hand-side (RHS).
Equation (A3) determines the order of .
Given that the RHS of (A3) is positive and that only the term 16 2 3 u in the LHS of (A3) is positive, there are two possibilities. First, 80 4 2 u has a lower order than 16 2 3 u , i.e., 80 4 2 u = o 16 2 3 u , where the notation X 2 = o (X 1 ) means lim u!0 X 2 X 1 = 0. Second, 80 4 2 u has the same order as 16 2 3 u , i.e., 80 4 2 u = O 16 2 3 u , where the notation X 2 = O (X 1 ) means X 2 X 1 converges to a …nite constant as u ! 0. Hence, the other candidate is:
which is labeled as large , where the superscript "large"follows from 2 5 u > 3 q 5 < 0, which means that large is a local maximum for function E A ; large .
In sum, the value of large serves as the only candidate for a disclosure equilibrium.
Compare E A large ; large with E A 0; large (Proof of Part (b))
By the pro…t expression (15) and using large = For su¢ ciently small u , E A large ; large < E A 0; large () 4 < 5 :
Thus, if 4 < 5 , large does not form a global maximum for function E A ; large , and hence large cannot be supported as a disclosure equilibrium. Given that large is the only disclosure equilibrium candidate, there is no disclosure equilibrium when 4 < 5 and u is su¢ ciently small.
Proof of Part (a)
Now suppose 4 5 , so that E A large ; large > E A 0; large for su¢ ciently small u . I then examine the shape of E A ; large and show that large forms a global maximum of E A ; large . Using Part (c) of Theorem 2 and the expression of large = 2 5 u + o (1), I can show that the FOC of E A ; large has the same sign as
where A 4 = 1280 2 u ; A 3 = 128 u 2 40 u ;
A 2 = 32 u 12 2 5 2 240 u 2 ;
A 1 = 64 u 6 2 5 2 80 u 2 ;
A 0 = 5 4 2 + 1280 2 Thus, for su¢ ciently small u , if 4 5 , then A 4 < 0; A 3 > 0; A 2 > 0; A 1 > 0; and A 0 < 0.
Taking derivative of A ( ) yields:
A 0 ( ) = 4A 4 3 + 3A 3 2 + 2A 2 + A 1 :
Given 4A 4 < 0; 3A 3 > 0; 2A 2 > 0; and A 1 > 0, it must be the case that A 0 (0) > 0 and A 0 (1) < 0 and that A 0 ( ) changes signs only once (by Descartes'"rule of signs").
Hence, A ( ) …rst increases and then decreases. Given that A ( ) is negative at small and large values of and that large is a local maximum for function E A ; large (i.e., A large " > 0 for su¢ ciently small "), A ( ) crosses zero twice, which corresponds to two local extreme values of . Recall that A ( ) has the same sign as the FOC of E A ; large , function E A ; large must …rst decrease, then increase, and …nally decrease. Thus, the two local maximum values are 0 and large .
Given that E A large ; large > E A 0; large (under the condition 4 5 ), it is clear that large forms a global maximum of E A ; large , which implies that large is supported as a disclosure equilibrium.
Proof of Proposition 4
By the FOC (16) in …rm A's disclosure decision problem, @ 2 E A @ @ = @ @ 1 9 ( s + ) 2 @ s @ :
Using the expression of s in Proposition 2, I can show that @ @ 1 9 ( s + ) 2 @ s @ / 16 ( + ) 2 ( + ) 2 u + 3 2 (2 + + ) 2 :
Hence, when u is su¢ ciently small, @ 2 E A @ @ > 0. Given symmetry, @ 2 E B @ @ > 0.
Proof of Proposition 5
Proof of Part (a)
When u = 0, price informativeness s is equal to 0, and so the pro…t expression in equation (15) becomes E A ( ; )j u=0 = m 2 9 + 9 + 4 36 ( + ) + 9 ( + ) :
Taking derivatives shows @ E A( ; )j u=0 @ < 0. Thus, no disclosure is a dominant strategy, which implies that the nondisclosure equilibrium serves as the unique equilibrium (i.e., = = 0).
The multiplicity result follows immediately from Part (a) of Theorem 3.
Using the expression of = = 2 5 u + o (1) and the pro…t expression in equation (15), I can show that E A 2 5 u ; 2 5 u E A (0; 0) has the same sign as ( u ) = 2000 4 3 u 1000 2 2 2 u +5 4 32 2 25 2 40 u +4 6 (4 5 ) :
Thus, when u is su¢ ciently small, ( u ) > 0 provided 4 > 5 .
Proof of Part (b) By = = 2 5 u + o (1), it is clear that decreases with u and diverges to 1 as u ! 0. By the expression of s and a f in Proposition 2, direct computations show that s and a f increase with , and that s ! 1 and a f ! 1, as ! 1.
Proof of Theorem 4
In the main text, I have already proved ER L ER ? L and CE S CE ? S . Now I prove E A > E ?
A and CS > CS ? .
Proof of E A > E ?
A Let s ( ; ) denote the expression of s in Proposition 2, i.e., s ( ; ) = 16 u( + ) 2 ( + ) 2 2 (2 + + ) 2 .
By pro…t expression (15), …rm A's expected pro…t in the setting with learning from prices is: Using the FOC of consumers'problem, I can compute:
Then using the expressions of q A and q B in Proposition 2, I can obtain CS = 2m 2 9 + 9 + 16 36 ( + ) + 2 s 9 ( s + ) :
Similarly, in the setting without learning from prices, CS ? = 2m 2 9 + 1 4 :
Thus, CS CS ? = 7 36 ( + ) + 2 s 9 ( s + ) > 0 ) CS > CS ? :
